This paper argues for a view that maximizes in the Stoics' epistemology the starkness and clarity characteristic of other parts of their philosophy. I reconsider our evidence concerning doxa (opinion/belief): should we really take the Stoics to define it as assent to the incognitive, so that it does not include the assent of ordinary people to their kataleptic impressions, and is thus actually inferior to agnoia (ignorance)? I argue against this, and for the simple view that in Stoicism assent is (...) either, in the case of the fool, doxa = agnoia, or alternatively, in that of the sage, epistêmê (knowledge). This view, together with reflection on the appropriate sense of "between" in the relevant reports of SE and Cicero, yields a sympathetic reading of an otherwise problematic challenge Sextus reports Arcesilaus as having prepared for the Stoic claim that katalêpsis, which is the criterion of truth, is between knowledge and opinion; on my view each side is proceeding in a philosophically legitimate way. (shrink)

Dans cet article, la paire pros ta alla/pros heauto dans le Parménide de Platon est analysée dans les termes d’une distinction entre la prédication ordinaire et la prédication en arborescence. J’engage une discussion avec mes critiques en soutenant que cette interprétation donne tout leur sens aux remarques méthodologiques de Platon, tout en rendant son argumentation plus efficace. Le Parménide fait le pont entre les dialogues de maturité et les développements techniques des derniers dialogues de Platon.

I suggest that there are no universally applicable principles for the study of Plato’s philosophy. Different students of Plato have different objects of interest that can make different ways of proceeding appropriate. For me the dialogues are the main object of study; I think they are best approached by interpreting literary elements and obviously philosophical content as working together. The paper includes illustrations of how parts of my picture of the developing theory of forms emerge from this type of engagement.

I suggest that there are no universally applicable principles for the study of Plato’s philosophy. Different students of Plato have different objects of interest that can make different ways of proceeding appropriate. For me the dialogues are the main object of study; I think they are best approached by interpreting literary elements and obviously philosophical content as working together. The paper includes illustrations of how parts of my picture of the developing theory of forms emerge from this type of engagement.